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In most collective decision problems, agents have private information on pa-
rameters entering their own utility functions as well as the others￿ . There is
often a preliminary stage, the ex ante stage, at which agents do not know
their precise information yet but share a common prior probability distribu-
tion on possible type pro￿les. At the later interim stage, agents learn their
own types and consequently update their probability distribution over the
others￿types.
An ex ante stage typically happens when decisions are made up by rep-
resentative institutions such as States. Consider for instance the application
of the ￿precautionary principle￿to public health issues. A mechanism is typ-
ically designed at the ex ante stage, before individuals privately know their
own state of health, and implemented at the interim stage (e.g., by requiring
a test from the individuals). As another example, consider those States like
Norway, Switzerland, etc. which are not members of the European Union
but are ￿associated￿ to it. When they decide whether to participate in a
particular E.U. program of scienti￿c cooperation and how much to invest in
case they participate, they do not know precisely what the quality of the
applicants (laboratories, students, etc. including the national ones) will be
but only have statistical data.
If an ex ante stage is available and binding agreements are feasible, as is
assumed in classical cooperative game theory, the agents commit themselves
in advance to a mechanism (i.e., a collective strategy to select decisions as
functions of the agents￿types), and implement this mechanism at the interim
stage. Since types constitute private information at this interim stage, one
must impose incentive constraints in order to guarantee that truthful reve-
lation be a Nash equilibrium in the game induced by the mechanism. By
the well-known revelation principle, Bayesian incentive compatible mecha-
nisms su¢ ce to describe any Nash equilibrium of any non-cooperative game
that the agents could design in order to exchange information and make col-
lective decisions. There is obviously no reason to forbid mixed strategies in
these general non-cooperative games so that one also has to consider random
mechanisms - namely, lotteries selecting collective decisions as functions of
the agents￿reported types.
If the underlying environment does not involve externalities, e.g., if it
consists of an exchange economy with private information, incentive com-
patible mechanisms can be chosen not only by the group as a whole, but
2also by coalitions of agents. At least coalitions can pose a threat. A natural
stability requirement (in addition to Pareto e¢ ciency) is then that the grand
coalition￿ s incentive compatible mechanism be not blocked by any smaller
coalition, i.e., that no subgroup can design an incentive compatible mech-
anism yielding a higher expected utility to all its members. This amounts
to saying that the grand coalition￿ s mechanism is in the core of a suitably
de￿ned characteristic function. We refer to this core as the ￿ex ante incen-
tive compatible core￿ . In the public health example, mechanisms through
which all the participants stay together make good sense, because of poten-
tial insurance e⁄ects. Natural coalitions might emerge at the ex ante stage:
for instance, individuals who are unlikely to be infected by the underlying
desease might not accept to cooperate. Solutions in the ex ante incentive
compatible core take all these threats into account, while favoring informa-
tion revelation by means of appropriate compensation schemes.
In the sequel, we focus on the ex ante incentive compatible core of an ex-
change economy with private information. In section 3, we ￿rst survey some
results in standard Walrasian economies (i.e., with perfectly divisible goods
and non-transferable utility). An example in Forges, Mertens and Vohra [14]
shows that in that model, the ex ante incentive compatible core can be empty.
However, Forges and Minelli [15] establish a positive result when no good is
initially owned by two di⁄erent agents and utility functions are additively
separable across goods.
We introduce particular N.T.U. economies with indivisible goods which
extend Shapley and Scarf [30]￿ s model to incomplete information. Every
agent initially owns at most one indivisible item, e.g., a house, and possibly
some money. Every agent has preferences over all items, which depend on
the available information, but can only make use of a single item. These
economies are not a strict particular case of Forges and Minelli￿ s ones but are
close to them. We give here a direct proof of the non-emptiness of the ex ante
incentive compatible core in this model. We ￿rst show that we can, without
loss of generality, restrict ourselves to ￿straightforward￿mechanisms, whose
outcomes are, for every agent, the probability of getting any given item,
together with an expected amount of money. We then rely on Scarf [29]￿ s
theorem.
In section 4, we turn to exchange economies in which unlimited monetary
transfers are allowed and utility functions are quasi-linear. As in the N.T.U.
case, Forges, Mertens and Vohra [14] provide an example of an economy with
perfectly divisible goods in which the ex ante incentive compatible core is
3empty. The example is shown to be robust but features a fully informed agent
and common values. As ￿rst shown by d￿ Aspremont and GØrard-Varet (see [4]
and [5]), if interim monetary transfers are possible, appropriate assumptions
on the prior beliefs and/or the utility functions (e.g., independent private
values) make ￿rst best solutions achievable in a Bayesian incentive compatible
way. By relying on this result, one can establish the non-emptiness of the ex
ante incentive compatible core in several classes of T.U. exchange economies.
We also consider unlimited monetary transfers in the economies with in-
divisible goods introduced in section 3. The resulting model is then an exten-
sion of Shapley and Shubik￿ s [31] assignment game. Though not needed for
the non-emptiness result, transfers still play an important role in this model,
by making it possible to achieve ￿rst best allocations. This is illustrated by
means of a detailed example.
Section 5 concludes with further observations on interim solution con-
cepts.
2 Basic de￿nitions
An exchange economy with private information consists of
￿ a set of agents N = f1;:::;ng
￿ l goods (each of which is either perfectly divisible or indivisible)
￿ for every agent i 2 N: a ￿nite set of types Ti, a consumption set Ci
￿ Rl
+, an initial endowment ei 2 Ci and a von Neumann-Morgenstern
utility function ui : T ￿Ci ! R, where T =
Q
i2N Ti. ui(t;:) is assumed
to be continuous and increasing for every t 2 T.
￿ a probability distribution q over T, such that without loss of generality,
q(ti) > 0 for every ti 2 Ti.
Notice that consumption sets and initial endowments are independent of
private information.
We assume that at the ex ante stage, i.e., before the agents are informed
of their types, each subset of agents (or coalition) S ￿ N, S 6= ;, can decide
on a mechanism ￿S, which will only be implemented at the interim stage
(i.e., when every agent knows his type) if S has formed.















and let ￿(XS) be the set of all probability distributions over XS. A (random1,
feasible) mechanism for S is a mapping ￿S : T ! ￿(XS) such that ￿S is
measurable w.r.t. TS =
Q
i2S Ti, namely ￿S(t) = ￿S(t0) for every t;t0 2 T :
tS = t0
S.
As usual, the interpretation is that every member of S has to tell his type
ti to the mechanism, which selects a feasible allocation in XS as a function
of the reported types. In order to de￿ne incentive compatibility, assume that
agent i 2 S, of type ti, pretends that his type is t0
i possibly di⁄erent from ti.












Let us denote as Ui(￿Sjti) the (interim) expected utility of agent i when he
truthfully reports his type to ￿S, namely
Ui(￿Sjti) = Ui(￿Sjti;ti)
￿S is incentive compatible (I.C.) if
Ui(￿Sjti) ￿ Ui(￿Sjti;t
0
i) for every i 2 S;ti;t
0
i 2 Ti (3)





We associate the following (N.T.U.) characteristic function with the econ-
omy2:
V
￿(S) = fv 2 R
n : 9 an I.C. mechanism ￿S s.t. Ui(￿S) ￿ vi 8i 2 Sg
1We allow for lotteries and free disposal. As shown in [16] and [14], both assumptions
can be helpful in the presence of incentive constraints. Lotteries may already play a role
under complete information (see, e.g., [1], [7], [8], [18], [21]).
2As in [20], ￿*￿reminds of incentive compatibility.
5V ￿ is well-behaved: for every S, V ￿(S) is closed, convex (thanks to random
mechanisms) and comprehensive. The ex ante incentive compatible core of
the economy is de￿ned as the (standard) core C(V ￿) of V ￿, namely as the set
of all vector payo⁄s v 2 V ￿(N) that cannot be blocked by any coalition (i.e.,
there does not exist S and w 2 V ￿(S) such that wi > vi for every i 2 S).
3 N.T.U. economies
3.1 Perfectly divisible goods
We capture perfectly divisible goods by setting Ci = Rl
+ for every i 2 N and
denote the corresponding economy as Ediv = fN;(Ti;ui;ei)i2N;qg. In this
context, Forges, Mertens and Vohra￿ s counterexample (see [14], section 6)
demonstrates that there is no hope for a general result on the non-emptiness
of C(V ￿). Nevertheless, by focusing on utility functions that are additively








i) 8i 2 N;t 2 T;xi 2 R
l
+
for some continuous, increasing functions ur
i(t;:) : R+ ! R, Forges and
Minelli [15] established the following
Proposition 1 If in Ediv no good is initially owned by two di⁄erent agents
(i.e., er
i > 0 ) er
j = 0 for every i;j 2 N;r = 1;:::;l) and utility functions
are additively separable across goods, the ex ante incentive compatible core is
non-empty.
Linear utility functions are obviously additively separable across goods.
Furthermore, starting with arbitrary initial endowments, we can rename the
goods according to their initial owner (i.e., good r initially owned by agent
i becomes good ri) and re-express the utility functions in terms of the new
goods. These utility functions are still linear. Hence
Corollary 1 If in Ediv utility functions are linear, the ex ante incentive com-
patible core is non-empty.
Obviously the corollary still holds with deterministic mechanisms ￿S :
T ! XS; this result was identi￿ed by many authors (see [16]). Random
mechanisms are however crucial in proposition 1.
63.2 Indivisible goods
Let us turn to a particular case of the economies introduced in section 2.
We set l = k + 1 and K = f1;:::;kg; goods in K are indivisible items (e.g.,
houses) while good l is perfectly divisible (e.g., money). We assume k ￿ n.
Agent i￿ s consumption set is Ci = f0;1g
k ￿ R+. His initial endowment ei
2 Ci satis￿es: er
i = 1 if r = i 2 K, er
i = 0 if r 2 K but r 6= i , el
i ￿ 0.
In other words, there are k di⁄erent, indivisible items; every agent k 2 K
initially owns exactly one item; all agents may own some money.
We will focus on particular utility functions, which express that every
agent only cares for a single item and that his favorite item depends on the
n-tuple of types t. Let wr
i(t) ￿ 0 be real numbers representing the utility of







i = 1]g + x
l
i (4)
where I denotes the indicator function. Observe that these utility functions
are not additively separable across goods (except for money). We denote the








n￿k ￿ R+ : Pn
i=1 xr









A feasible allocation x thus consists of an n ￿ k matrix [xr
i], each entry of
which is 0 or 1, and an allocation of the divisible good. xr
i = 1 if item r is
allocated to agent i, xr
i = 0 otherwise. Since there is exactly one item r in
the economy, there is at most one ￿1￿in every column r. However, at this
point, several items may be allocated to the same agent.
Leaving aside incomplete information, the previous model is more general
than Shapley and Scarf [30]￿ s one, because it possibly involves a perfectly
divisible good (in [30], el
i = 0 for every i), but less general than Quinzii [28]￿ s
one, where the utility functions are not necessarily separable in money.
The speci￿c form of the economy Eind allows for a very tractable char-
acterization of I.C. mechanisms, which are originally de￿ned as in section 2.
For simplicity, we focus on the grand coalition N. We ￿rst introduce a partic-
ular class of mechanisms, which we call straightforward; then we show that,
without loss of generality, one can focus on straightforward mechanisms.
A straightforward mechanism associates with every t 2 T an n￿k substo-
chastic matrix ￿(t) and a deterministic allocation m(t) of the divisible good l.
7The ￿rst condition means that the entries of ￿(t) are non-negative and that
the sum of the entries in each row and each column is less than one3. More























These inequalities are interpreted as follows: if t is the n-tuple of reported
types, then agent i obtains item r with probability ￿r
i(t) and the amount
mi(t) of the divisible good. The total probability of allocating item r to
some agent is less than 1, and the total probability that agent i gets some
item is also less than 1. By (a variant of) the Birkho⁄-von Neumann theorem,
any substochastic matrix is a convex combination of n ￿ k matrices whose
entries are 0 or 1, with at most one ￿1￿in every row and every column4. As
a consequence, every straightforward mechanism can indeed be viewed as a
random, feasible mechanism in the sense of section 2, i.e., as a probability
distribution over the set XS of feasible allocations de￿ned in (5). In addition,
straightforward mechanisms never allocate two items to the same agent.
Straightforward mechanisms can also be interpreted as time-sharing schemes:
￿r
i(t) is the fraction of time during which agent i uses item r. The feasibility
conditions state that no agent can use two items at the same time and that no
item can be used by two agents at the same time. This interpretation allows
to recover perfectly divisible goods. However, thanks to the Birkho⁄-von
Neumann theorem, we do not have to rely on it.
Expected utilities from a straightforward mechanism (￿;m) are easily
3A ￿bi-stochastic￿matrix corresponds to the case where these sums are exactly equal
to one.





















Incentive compatibility of (￿;m) can thus be derived as in (3).
Lemma 1 Let ￿ : T ! ￿(XN) be a (random, feasible) I.C. mechanism for
the grand coalition in Eind. There exists an I.C. straightforward mechanism
(￿;m) which achieves the same interim expected utilities as ￿.





































De￿ned in this way, m satis￿es the feasibility conditions for a straightforward
mechanism. Once we replace the second term in (7) as a function of m,
the still relevant part of ￿(:jt), which appears in the ￿rst term of (7), is a
probability distribution over ￿nitely many n ￿ k matrices [xr
i] satisfying the
feasibility constraints in (5). Assume that for some t, there exists a matrix
[xr
i], which we still denote as x, such that ￿(xjt) > 0 and with several ￿1￿
in row i. This means that, when t is reported, agent i gets several items
with positive probability. Let r￿ be (one of) agent i￿ s favorite item(s) at t
(i.e., such that wr￿
i (t) = maxr2K:xr
i=1 wr
i(t)). Modify the matrix by setting
xr￿
i = 1, xr
i = 0 for r 6= r￿ (we thus ￿rst alter the support of ￿(:jt) and
then, if necessary, adjust the probability values). The change does not a⁄ect
agents j 6= i (we only considered row i), nor the expected utility of agent i
at t = (ti;t￿i). Furthermore, it may only lower the expected utility of agent
i at (t0
i;t￿i), since we have disposed of some items which did not matter for
ti but could matter for t0
i. Hence, incentive compatibility is still ful￿lled. By
repeating this construction, we are left with an I.C. mechanism, which we
9still denote as ￿, selecting n￿k matrices with at most one ￿1￿in every row



































(￿;m), as constructed above, de￿nes an I.C. straightforward mechanism
equivalent to ￿. Q.E.D.
An analog to the previous lemma holds for every coalition S, so that the
characteristic function V ￿ associated with Eind is fully determined by I.C.
straightforward mechanisms. Upon being measurable w.r.t. TS, a straight-
forward mechanism (￿S;mS) for coalition S will satisfy feasibility constraints
similar to (6), by setting
￿
r
S;i(t) = mS;i(t) = 0 if i = 2 S or r = 2 KS
where KS = fr 2 K : 9i 2 S s.t. er
i = 1g is the set of items initially owned by
members of S. Equivalently, conditions (6) hold with ￿i 2 S￿and ￿r 2 KS￿
instead of ￿i 2 N￿and ￿r 2 K￿ , respectively.
We will establish the following extension of Shapley and Scarf [30]￿ s result:
Proposition 2 The ex ante incentive compatible core of Eind is non-empty.
As in [30] and [28], the proof applies Scarf [29]￿ s theorem. We thus
have to check that the game V ￿ induced by Eind is balanced, i.e., that
\S2SV ￿(S) ￿ V ￿(N) for every balanced family of coalitions5. This is an
immediate consequence of the following lemma:
Lemma 2 Let S be a balanced family of coalitions with associated weights
￿S, S 2 S, and let (￿S;mS) be a (straightforward) I.C. mechanism for S, S 2
S. Then (￿;m) =
P
S2S ￿S(￿S;mS) is a (straightforward) I.C. mechanism
for N.
5Recall that a family S of coalitions is balanced if there are weights ￿S, S 2 S, such
that
P
S2S;i2S ￿S = 1 for every i 2 N.
10Proof of the lemma: Let us for instance check that
P
i2N ￿ir(t) ￿ 1. The






























where a(r) denotes the initial owner of item r. The other feasibility conditions
are similar. The incentive compatibility conditions are linear inequalities and
thus hold for (￿;m), which is a linear combination of the (￿S;mS). Q.E.D.
The mechanism (￿;m) in the statement of lemma 2 is not, as such, a
convex combination of the (￿S;mS), S 2 S. Hence its feasibility had to be
checked. As in the proof of proposition 1 (see [15]), the previous reasoning
uses the fact that each good can be identi￿ed with the agent who initially
owns it. However, in [15], the grand coalition￿ s mechanism constructed from
the balanced family￿ s mechanisms allocates the di⁄erent goods independently
of each other, which would not give rise to a feasible (straightforward) mech-
anism in the present model.
Clearly, the linearity of interim expected utilities Ui(￿;mjti;t0
i) as a func-
tion of mechanisms is extremely helpful in proposition 2 but this is not the
only key to the result. As soon as random mechanisms are allowed, interim
expected utilities become linear in the mechanism but this does not ensure
the non-emptiness of the ex ante I.C. core, as shown in [14]. If economies
with random mechanisms are naively interpreted as linear, the exact feasi-
bility condition imposed on mechanisms in section 2 is weakened to expected
feasibility (see [15] and [16], section 4.3.2). In the economies with indivisible
goods considered above, expected and exact feasibility are basically equiva-
lent, thanks to the von Neumann-Birkho⁄ theorem. To apply this result, we
needed to concentrate on straightforward mechanisms, and for this, we used
the particular form of utility functions in (4). Whether proposition 2 holds
in more general models, like the ones considered in [28] or [6], is an open
question.
4 T.U. economies
Let us assume, in the basic model of section 2, that good l = k+1 is perfecly
divisible (let us refer to it as money) and that utility functions are quasi-linear







i i 2 N;t 2 T (8)
where wi(t;:) is continuous and increasing for every i 2 I and t 2 T. Let
us further assume that individual allocations in money need not be bounded
below or above: Ci = Rk
+ ￿R (resp., Ci = f0;1g
k ￿R) if goods are perfectly
divisible (resp., indivisible). Feasibility obviously requires that the aggregate
allocation in money does not exceed the total initial endowment in that good.
We may thus as well assume that el
i = 0 for every i 2 N. For reasons that
will be clear below, we denote the underlying economy as ETU (we need not
distinguish perfectly divisible goods from indivisible ones).























According to the de￿nition of section 2, a mechanism ￿S for coalition
S is described by probability distributions over XS for every type pro￿le t.
However, since the utility functions are quasi-linear, the incentive compatibil-
ity constraints only depend on the conditional expected monetary transfers.
Hence we can restrict ourselves without loss of generality to deterministic
money transfers and describe ￿S as (￿S;mS), where ￿S selects feasible alloca-
tions of goods r = 1;:::;k and mS : T ! RN selects feasible money transfers,
namely
P
i2S mS;i(t) ￿ 0.
Furthermore, type independent monetary transfers are obviously incen-
tive compatible, so that the characteristic function V ￿ de￿ned in section 2







The ex ante incentive compatible core simpli￿es into the set C(v￿) of all
vector payo⁄s v 2 RN such that
P




For comparison, we also de￿ne the characteristic function v which prevails
in the absence of incentive constraints. In this case, free disposal of money
cannot be useful. Morover, if the utility functions are concave, lotteries are








By the complete information results (see [19] for perfectly divisible goods
and [31] for indivisible goods), C(v) is not empty. If v￿(N) = v(N), namely
if incentive compatibility constraints do not matter in the grand coalition,
C(v) ￿ C(v￿), so that the ex ante incentive compatible core is also non-
empty.
Starting with d￿ Aspremont and GØrard-Varet ([4], [5]), a number of pa-
pers (e.g., [2], [3], [9], [10], [22]) have identi￿ed conditions on the beliefs q
and/or the utility functions wi(t;x1
i;:::;xk
i) which guarantee that the grand
coalition N can achieve ￿rst best allocations by means of an incentive compat-
ible mechanism with budget balanced transfers6, which implies that v￿(N) =
v(N). Hence these conditions also ensure the non-emptiness of C(v￿). We
illustrate this kind of result with two particular simple sets of su¢ cient con-
ditions (see [14] for further details and other results making use of the same
reasoning).
Proposition 3 If in ETU the beliefs are independent (i.e., q(t) =
Q
i2N q(ti)




i)1￿r￿k), the ex ante incentive compatible core is non-empty.
The next proposition is established in [22]. Let us denote as qi;i+1(:jti)
agent i￿ s conditional probability distribution (induced by q) over Ti+1 given
ti, where i + 1 is understood mod: n.
Proposition 4 If in ETU the beliefs satisfy
qi;i+1(:jti) 6= qi;i+1(:jsi) 8i;8ti;si;ti 6= si,
the ex ante incentive compatible core is non-empty.
The previous analysis applies in economies with perfectly divisible goods
as well as in the T.U. version of the economies with indivisible goods that
we considered in section 3.2. However, monetary transfers do not play any
essential role to make the core non-empty in the latter case, since it was
6Namely, (￿;m) such that
P
i2N mi(t) = 0.
13already non-empty with non-transferable utilities. More precisely, proposition
2 holds in the T.U. case, and the proof of the analog of lemma 2 can be
simpli￿ed by relying on the Bondareva-Shapley theorem instead of Scarf [29]￿ s
(see [13]). Although unlimited monetary transfers are not necessary for the
non-emptiness of the core, they are nevertheless useful to achieve ￿rst best
solutions in the ex ante incentive compatible core. This is illustrated in the
next example.
Example
Let us assume that n = 4 and k = 2. Agents 1 and 2, who can be
viewed as sellers, both own an item, say, a house, and know, at the interim
stage, whether the quality of their own house is high or low: T1 = fh1;l1g,
T2 = fh2;l2g. The probability distribution over the sellers￿types is q(h1;h2) =
q(l1;l2) = 3
8, q(h1;l2) = q(l1;h2) = 1
8. Agents 3 and 4, the potential buyers,
have no private information. The reservation price of the sellers is ph (resp.,
pl) for a high (resp., low) quality house. In other words, the utility from
selling his house is ￿ph (resp., ￿pl) for a high (resp., low) type seller. The
reservation prices of the buyers are uh and ul respectively, i.e., acquiring a
high (resp., low) quality house yields utility uh (resp., ul) to each buyer. We
assume that ul < pl < ph < uh and that 1
2(ul + uh) < 1
2(pl + ph) (e.g., 0, 9,
12, 20) and that the utility of any agent is 0 when no sale takes place.7
Since the buyers are not submitted to incentive constraints, we will, with-
out loss of generality, focus on transfers summing up to 0 throughout the
example.
Let us ￿rst consider a seller-buyer coalition fi;jg, i 2 f1;2g, j 2 f3;4g.
The seller has then two equiprobable types, which we denote as h and l. We
face a simple, discrete version of Myerson [25]￿ s ￿lemon problem￿ . A mecha-
nism for a seller-buyer coalition consists of the probability of trade ￿h (resp.,
￿l) when the seller reports type h (resp., l) and the corresponding expected
transfers mh, ml from the buyer to the seller (note that the transfers include
the sale price as well as possible fees). By eliminating the transfers from the
incentive constraints (see, e.g., [22] or [25]), the optimization problem of a
7For a concrete example, think of the termites invading some regions of France. The
qualities of houses in the same neighborhood are highly correlated. We assume that
mechanisms are designed before the sellers know the quality of their houses, which is
consistent with the fact that quality is only checked in case of potential transactions.





￿h(uh ￿ ph) +
1
2
￿l(ul ￿ pl)] s:t: 0 ￿ ￿h ￿ ￿l ￿ 1
so that, under our assumptions,
v
￿(fi;jg) = 0 i 2 f1;2g;j 2 f3;4g
Let us set gh = uh ￿ ph > 0. Observe that, in absence of incentive con-
straints, v(fi;jg) = 1
2gh. Trade is indeed bene￿cial in state h, but the in-
centive compatibility conditions prevent revelation of information from the
seller.
Let us turn to the grand coalition N = f1;2;3;4g. First best e¢ ciency
requires to sell the high quality houses, and only those, at every state of
nature. Hence,
v(N) = gh
We will construct an incentive compatible mechanism achieving gh as sum of
expected payo⁄s, so that
v
￿(N) = gh
As observed above, this implies that C(v) ￿ C(v￿) and provides a simple
procedure to construct expected payo⁄s in the ex ante incentive compatible
core.8





















The sum of expected payo⁄s from ￿ is gh. Obviously, ￿ is not incentive
compatible, but one can construct transfers m such that (￿;m) is incentive


























8The procedure can be applied to a large class of mechanisms (see, e.g., [2], [3], [4], [5],
[9], [10], [22]).















The transfers m2 to the second seller can be chosen in a similar way. In
order to balance the transfers, one can simply set m3 = ￿m1, m4 = ￿m2.
The mechanism (￿;m) thus associates buyer 3 (resp., 4) with seller 1 (resp.,
2) but sale only takes place if the seller￿ s house is of high quality. (￿;m)
yields the expected payo⁄
gh
4 to each trader. The mechanism re￿ ects that
sale prices are in￿ uenced by the presence of low quality items; the transfers in
the low state should be interpreted as a fee that the potential buyers pay to
get information and avoid a bad decision. Many other mechanisms achieving
ex post e¢ ciency can be constructed. In particular, as in [10], it is possible to
design the transfers in such a way that the mechanism is interim individually
rational for the sellers, who fully extract the surplus9.
Let us end the analysis of the example by showing that the expected payo⁄








4 ), belongs to C(v￿). We have evaluated
































This example shows that it may be better for the agents (in the sense
of generating a higher sum of expected payo⁄s) to stay together at the ex
ante stage in order to exchange information within the grand coalition. For
instance, this enables the agents to exploit the possible correlation between
types and to achieve ￿rst best e¢ ciency through full revelation.
9Adding (resp., subtracting)
gh
4 to (resp., from) all previous transfers gives the sur-
plus to the sellers (resp., buyers). All these mechanisms, including the latter, are interim












In this paper, we have focused on the ex ante incentive compatible core, which
is de￿ned without any ambiguity, as the classical core of a well-behaved char-
acteristic function. As pointed out by Myerson (see, e.g., [23], [24], [26], [27]),
it might be that no ex ante stage is available. In many examples, coalitions
do form at the interim stage. The main issue then is that the negotiation
over mechanisms already conveys information on the agents￿ types, so that
a completely di⁄erent approach is needed. This problem is still widely open
(see [11], [12], [26] [27] for a discussion of the issues and possible solutions;
[16] surveys most available results).
The previous di¢ culties disappear if coalitions form at the interim stage,
but cannot exchange information at that stage. This approach was followed
by Wilson [33] and Vohra [32] in order to de￿ne the coarse core and the
incentive compatible coarse core, respectively. The latter solution concept
assumes that coalitions S use incentive compatible mechanisms ￿S as in this
paper. But coalition S can block proposals from the grand coalition at the
interim stage, namely as soon as it is common knowledge in S, at that stage,
that some incentive compatible mechanism improves the expected payo⁄s
of all members of S (i.e., there exists an incentive compatible mechanism
yielding a higher payo⁄ to all types in TS that are common knowledge in
S). As a consequence, mechanisms in the incentive compatible coarse core
are interim individually rational (see, e.g., [9], [10]) and interim incentive
e¢ cient (in the sense of Holmstr￿m and Myerson [20]).
The incentive compatible coarse core is empty in Forges, Mertens and
Vohra [14]￿ s example, both in the T.U and the N.T.U. case. It is non-empty
in exchange economies with linear utility functions or with divisible goods
as in section 3.2: both corollary 1 and proposition 2 apply to the incentive
compatible coarse core (see Forges [13] for a detailed proof of the result in
the case of T.U. economies with indivisible goods). This might let us hope
that the incentive compatible coarse core behaves in the same way as the ex
ante incentive compatible core. However, nothing of the kind is clear for the
results which depend on unlimited monetary transfers, as propositions 3, 4
and 5. Even the basic T.U. structure of the model disappears at the interim
stage (see [16] and [14] for further comments).
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